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The Choice of Electoral Systems in DictatorshipsMasaaki Higashijima1Waseda Universityhigashij@aoni.waseda.jpEric C. C. Chang2Michigan State Universityechang@msu.eduApril 2016AbstractThis paper develops a theoretical framework to account for the variation in electoralsystems of dictatorships. We argue that “strong” dictators who have capacity to inducegreater compliance from their opponents are incentivized to employ proportionalrepresentation systems to divide and conquer the opposition, while “weak” dictatorslacking in such capacity tend to rely on the seat premium associated with majoritariansystems to co-opt ruling elites in the legislature. Using newly collected cross-national datain electoral authoritarian regimes, we find strong empirical evidence supporting our theory.We also explicitly test the causal mechanisms, finding that majoritarian systems bias seatdistributions in favor of ruling parties, foster a unified opposition, and lower voter turnoutmore so than PR systems in electoral autocracies.
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IntroductionOver the last decade, a burgeoning literature on authoritarian politics has documentedhow elections help autocrats hold onto power (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). According tothis perspective, authoritarian elections enable dictators to co-opt ruling elites andopposition groups within society. Specifically, elections serve as a competitive auction toallow dictators to efficiently distribute the spoils of office to ruling elites (Blaydes 2011).Additionally, by manufacturing an overwhelming victory at elections, authoritarian leaderscan use elections to demonstrate their regime’s invincibility and deter challengers(Magaloni 2006; Simpser 2013). Elections also enable dictators to divide and conquer theopposition since moderate opposition parties tend to participate in regime-sponsoredelections, while radical opposition parties often boycott them (Lust-Okar 2004). Finally,election results may also inform dictators about key bases of support and oppositionstrongholds (Malesky and Schuler 2010; Reuter and Robertson 2011).Far less explored, however, is the variation in electoral systems that authoritarianregimes institutionalize. In particular, the literature on electoral system selection hasalmost exclusively focused on democracies. Meanwhile, we know little about the conditionsunder which authoritarian rulers prefer one type of electoral system over another.Failing to consider the origins of electoral systems in authoritarian regimes isconsequential. Theoretically, since electoral rules shape politicians’ strategizing andbehavior during elections (Cox 1997), our knowledge about electoral politics inauthoritarian regimes remains incomplete without a deeper understanding of the origins ofelectoral institutions. Empirically, as our cross-national data reveal below, there is widevariation in electoral systems among authoritarian regimes across time and space. Also,unlike democracies where electoral rules tend to remain fixed over time, autocraticelectoral institutions appear to change quite often at dictators’ own will.3Finally, we are intrigued by the following puzzle: Much like in advanced democracies,single-member district (SMD) systems in electoral autocracies also bring a large seatpremium to large parties. Therefore, high seats-votes disproportionalities under SMDsystems generate an efficient, pro-regime electoral bias for ruling parties under autocraticgovernments and, therefore, should be the natural choice of self-serving dictators. Yet,proportional representation (PR) systems—a seemingly sub-optimal institutional choice—are still used in many electoral authoritarian regimes. The wide variation in electoralsystems and the intriguing observation that some dictators prefer PR systems over SMDsystems provokes the question: How do we explain dictators’ optimal choice of electoralsystems? Specifically, under what conditions do autocrats decide to adopt PR systemsdespite the fact that SMD systems generate a pro-regime seat premium?
3 For instance, Putin’s Russia shifted from a mixed electoral system to a pure PR systemwith a nationwide district in 2005. Nazarbaev’s Kazakhstan changed to a pure PR systemprior to the 2007 parliamentary election. In contrast, Belarus, although quite similar toRussia and Kazakhstan, has retained the SMD system since its independence.
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Building upon the literature regarding authoritarian institutions, this paper develops atheoretical framework to answer these questions. We first argue that different electoralsystems are associated with different political and economic effects pertinent to thesurvival of authoritarian regimes. For instance, by lowering the barrier for entry, PRsystems encourage potential challengers to participate in politics through the existinginstitutional structure rather than taking an anti-regime, confrontational approach, andhence make dictators’ co-optation strategy more effective. Also, after co-opting potentialchallengers into the exisiting institutional arrangments, PR systems further keep theopposition fragmented by discouraging the opposition to form a unified electoral coalition.Therefore, PR systems serve as an institutional device for autocrats to divide and conquerthe opposition without having to use coercion or violence, Finally, by boosting voters’turnout, PR systems help dictators demonstrate their popularity and invincibility of theregime, thus deterring potential challengers. In contrast, SMD systems provide a seatpremium to ruling parties that allow dictators to incorporate larger segments of rulingelites as legislators. In other words, SMD systems help dictators co-opt ruling elites withinstitutionalized rent-seeking opportunities.Given these diverse political and economic effects associated with different electoralsystems, we argue that dictators strategically choose electoral systems that address theirpolitical needs. Specifically, we argue that dictators’ strengths crucially determine theiroptimal choice of electoral systems. We charge that “strong dictators”—those withresources and capacity to induce compliance from ruling elites and society—are morelikely to adopt PR systems. In contrast, “weak dictators”—those who lack the necessaryresources to induce cooperation from potential opponents—have greater incentive toboost their seat share through SMD systems.To test our theoretical expectations, we use a newly collected cross-national data set ofelectoral systems and election results in electoral authoritarian states covering 92countries from 1946-2007. Using resource wealth as a proxy to capture dictators’ strengthto induce compliance, we find that dictators with abundant natural resources are morelikely to adopt PR systems. The result is robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses includinginstrumental variables (IV) estimations, different model specifications, alternativeestimation strategies, different measures for the dependent and independent variables, andpotential outliers. We also explicitly provide cross-national evidence on the divergenteffects of different electoral systems.This paper makes four key contributions to the literature. First, by exploring the originsof electoral institutions in dictatorships, we add to the ongoing debate about the role ofelections in authoritarian politics. As discussed, scholars have identified various beneficialfunctions of authoritarian elections for authoritarian leaders. On the flip side, recentstudies have begun to question the consolidating effects of elections. Reuter (2012), forinstance, shows that in order to win elections, dictators need to prioritize ruling elites’loyalty over their competence when making subnational personnel appointments. As aresult, elections can undermine authoritarian regimes’ policy performance and long-term
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stability. Other scholars also highlight the potential destabilizing effect of elections,suggesting that elections in authoritarian regimes eventually lead to democratization(Baturo 2007; Lindberg 2009; Bunce and Wolchik 2011). By taking into account the originsof electoral systems, this paper offers theoretical insight into the principal features ofautocratic elections. Importantly, by considering dictators’ rationale in selecting electoralinstitutions, this paper enhances our understanding of the political dynamics inauthoritarian politics.Second, we contribute to parallel scholarship on electoral manipulation (Simpser 2013)by highlighting an under-explored, yet important, aspect of electoral fraud in dictatorships.In addition to electoral chicanery, we suggest that dictators can bias election results in theirfavor by manipulating the electoral formula. Third, this paper contributes to the electoralsystem choice literature. While acknowledging the importance of opposition threats (Boix1999), partisan bias (Calvo 2009), and economic interests (Rogowski 1987; Cusack, Iversenand Soskice 2007), we posit a new theory for the choice of electoral system in autocracies,emphasizing dictators’ capacity to derive compliance from their opponents. Finally, ourpaper contributes to the emerging literature rethinking the oil curse (Haber and Menaldo2011; Paler 2013). Our empirical finding suggests that electoral autocrats rich in naturalresources may not necessarily alienate themselves from the citizens. Rather, these strongdictators tend to adopt PR systems, thereby lowering the barrier of entry and encouragecitizens’ political participation.In the next section, we review the literature on electoral system choice, suggestingtheoretical gaps that should be addressed when considering dictators’ calculus in selectingan electoral system. The third section provides a theory of electoral system design inelectoral autocracies and derives observable implications. The penultimate section offerscross-national evidence for our theoretical expectations. Finally, conclusions follow.
Literature ReviewScholars have advanced three explanations for the selection of electoral systems: (1)political, (2) economic, and (3) historical factors, mostly focusing on democratic countries.However, we suggest that crucial differences in scope conditions between democracies andautocracies make it difficult to directly apply the pre-existing theories derived fromdemocracies to the authoritarian context.Elevating the political explanation, Rokkan (1970) put forward two influentialhypotheses to account for the adoption of proportional representation in Europe duringthe early twentieth century.4 Rokkan’s first hypothesis argues that incumbents implement
4 For criticism of Boix (1999), see Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2007) and Calvo (2009).Using qualitative sources on electoral system reforms in advanced democracies, Kreuzer(2010) argues that Boix’s (1999) explanation is more valid than Cusack, Iversen and
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PR systems to avoid a devastating electoral defeat in the face of socialist mobilization. Boix(1999) advances this hypothesis and contends that ruling parties adopt PR systems whenthe rightwing parties are seriously divided between conservative and liberal camps underthe socialist threat. Rokkan’s second hypothesis, furthered by Calvo (2009), suggests theadoption of PR is also driven by the extent to which established parties want to avoid“partisan bias” induced by majoritarian electoral systems. In the face of severe partycompetition, parties with a geographically concentrated distribution of votes enjoy moreseats than those parties with geographically dispersed votes under SMD. Therefore, the oldparties with geographically dispersed votes prefer to shift to PR systems to attenuatepartisan bias.Other scholars have advanced economic explanations. Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice(2007) reason that rightist parties’ adoption of PR systems depends on the extent to whichbusinesses and unions forge cooperative relationships at the national level. If parties on theright are embedded in the cross-class, consensus-based decision-making process (throughskill formation and well-established collective bargaining), then they can enjoy benefitsfrom regulatory politics rather than incur costs induced by distributional conflict under PRsystems. Therefore, they charge that domestic cross-class alliances encourage governmentsto choose PR systems. Rogowski (1987) instead focuses on an external economic factor. Heargues open economies encourage governments to resist protectionist pressures, maintainhigh efficiency, and ensure stable policies to remain competitive on the internationalmarket. Under such circumstances, PR systems become the preferred choice for trade-dependent countries since PR systems allow incumbents to better contain regional andsectorial pressures.Lastly, many scholars suggest the choice of electoral system is highly influenced byhistorical factors. A dominant view emphasizes the path-dependent nature of electoralsystems, arguing that they are surprisingly stable because the choice is strongly influencedby preexisting parties (Cox 1998). Tsebelis (1990) argues that electoral systems affectlegislators’ interests within a given party. Hence, it is difficult to change electoral systems,even if an alternative electoral system is rational for the party as a whole. Meanwhile,recent studies highlight the importance of uncertainty in transitioning countries, showingthat strategic institutional design does not necessarily allow reformers to reap the benefitsthey anticipated because of the uncertainty in new democracies (Moser 2001; Andrews andJackman 2005). For instance, after examining the cases of Central and Eastern Europe,Ishiyama (1997) concludes that substantial changes in electoral systems would haveoccurred if communist parties and oppositional forces had thought of their organizationsas seat-maximizing political parties rather than as mass movements when they selected theelectoral system. 5Soskice’s (2007). For Cusack and his colleagues’ response to Kreuzer (2010), see Cusack,Iversen and Soskice (2010).
5 For systematic comparisons regarding the impacts of electoral systems on party systemsbetween advanced and new democracies, see Moser and Scheiner (2012).
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2016-001
6
Although these three explanations are insightful in understanding the selection ofelectoral systems in democracies, it is difficult to directly apply these theories to theauthoritarian context since most of their core assumptions are unlikely to be met. Forexample, the Rokkan-Boix hypothesis treats strong socialist threats as the driving force toadopting PR systems, yet most contemporary authoritarian countries are not necessarilyexposed to such imminent opposition threats. 6 Similarly, while the Rokkan-Calvohypothesis and Rogowski’s international economy perspective address why incumbentsadopt PR systems even in the absence of strong socialist mobilization, their theories rely onthe assumption that strong political competition either leads to partisan bias ordistributional conflict between economic classes which produces different electoralsystems. However, opposition parties in authoritarian states are generally too weak to beviable alternatives. Although opposition parties are allowed to participate in authoritarianelections, they have limited organizational capacities and monetary resources, makingelectoral alternation a remote possibility (Lust-Okar and Jamal 2002; Schedler 2013).Finally, based on the theory of varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001), Cusack,Iversen and Soskice (2007) focus on two types of capitalism—liberal market andcoordinated market economies—to explain the choice of electoral systems in pre-warEurope. Yet neither of these two types of capitalism is systematically present inauthoritarian regimes.Lastly, regarding the historical, path-dependence explanation, we argue that the choiceof electoral systems in authoritarian regimes is much more fluid and counters the highlystable nature of electoral systems in advanced democracies. In autocracies, political leadersmay have more discretion in designing pliable electoral systems. Meanwhile, the utility ofelectoral institutions is more predictable in authoritarian regimes than in new democracies.For instance, examining electoral systems in the Middle East, Lust-Okar and Jamal (2002)note “both sides [incumbents and opponents] know their preferences over the electoralrule … majoritarian systems and single-member districts tend to limit the participation ofsmaller parties … Elites hold firm preferences over electoral laws when they negotiate witheach other” (345-346).
The Divergent Effects of SMD and PR under Authoritarian RegimesPoliticians strive to hold onto power. This is particularity true for authoritarian leaderswho may face dire consequences after losing office. To stay in power, dictators employ avariety of means, such as violent repression and distribution of patronage. Recentscholarship has begun to highlight how dictators use political institutions, such as elections,parties and legislatures, to consolidate their rule. When authoritarian rulers use elections,the literature suggests that dictators employ various techniques to ensure an
6 Indeed, Boix recognized his theoretical expectation is only applicable in democraciessatisfying certain presumptions (Boix 1999, 622).
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overwhelming electoral victory to demonstrate their invincible strengths to potentialchallengers (Geddes 2006; Magaloni 2006).To manufacture a landslide victory, recent studies emphasize the use of electoral fraud—defined as a series of illegal measures that bias election results in favor of the incumbent(Lehoucq 2003)—in the context of authoritarian regimes (Simpser 2013). Electoralviolence, tampering with the ballot box, media bias, packing election management bodies,vote-buying, and highly restrictive electoral laws are all examples of blatant electoralmanipulation (Kelly 2012; Hafner-Burton et al. 2014).One important, yet less explored, strategy of electioneering by dictators is the choice ofelectoral system. Similar to democratic countries, authoritarian leaders are able to bias theelectoral results by employing different electoral rules that affect voting procedures,district size, and other features of election systems. In addition to their impact on electoralresults, electoral systems also yield various political and economic effects (Cox 1997;Lihphart 1999; Persson and Tabellini 2000). For instance, PR systems are more likely tolead to a higher turnout, less strategic voting, greater government instability, highergovernment spending and deficits, greater income equality, and higher consumer prices.7Given these diverse political and economic effects associated with different electoralsystems, we argue that dictators strategically choose electoral systems to meet theirpolitical needs. Parallel to what Franzese (2002) refers to as the “electioneering RamseyRule,” this paper suggests that dictators will use all available institutional tools for politicalgains inversely proportional to their marginal cost.Importantly, we argue that the adoption of SMD systems enables dictators toincorporate large portions of ruling elites into the legislature as an institutionalized rent-seeking mechanism. Sharing rents or other economic privileges has been the mostconventional way to co-opt ruling elites in authoritarian regimes. Yet, distributingpatronage spoils to ruling elites may not be enough to deter their coup d’état threatbecause it is uncertain that the dictator will continue to give such favors in the future. As away of making a credible commitment to elites, many studies suggest that a dictator canutilize the authoritarian legislature, credibly guaranteeing a long-lasting opportunity toenjoy rents from the regime (Magaloni 2008; Lust-Okar 2009; Blaydes 2011).We add to this literature by emphasizing the advantages derived from electoral systems.Specifically, SMD systems allow dictators to retain a large pool of legislative seats for rulingelites due to high seats-votes disproportionalities. In other words, Duverger (1956)’s well-known mechanical and psychological effects from majoritarian systems yield a significantseat bias to the governing authoritarian party by default. SMD systems can also allowauthoritarian leaders to gerrymander single member districts in favor of the ruling party,furthering them to produce an even larger seat bias. Ahmed (2013) finds that, in mid-nineteenth century Europe when electoral competition was minimal and socialist threatswere still very weak, ruling parties tended to resort to redistricting in order to enjoy a seat
7 See Rogowski and Kayser (2002) for a thorough review.
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bias to maintain electoral dominance. Taken together, SMD systems bias election results infavor of the ruling party in authoritarian regimes, an advantage we term “the SMD seatpremium.”The SMD seat premium is nicely illustrated by the cases of Singapore and Malaysia, twowell-known electoral authoritarian regimes in Asia. Both countries have heldparliamentary elections since independence and used majoritarian electoral systems withsingle-member districts. On average, the countries’ ruling parties (People’s Action Party inSingapore and Barisan Nasional in Malaysia) obtained 87% of the total seats with only 63%of the total votes between 1959-2008, suggesting they have received very large seatpremiums (24%).8Figure 1 further illustrates how majoritarian systems tend to underrepresentopposition parties and bias seats in favor of ruling parties in electoral authoritarianregimes.9 Under PR systems, shares of votes and seats tend to coincide for both ruling andopposition parties (Figures 3 [b] [d]). Under majoritarian systems, however, seat sharesare highly skewed toward the 100% for ruling parties and toward the 0% for oppositionparties, suggesting the strong presence of the SMD seat premium in authoritarian regimes(Figures 3 [a] [c]).
Figure 1: Kernel Density on Shares of Seats and Votes under Different Electoral
Systems
8 For other anecdotal evidence for the pro-dictator bias from some Middle Easterncountries (Yemen, Palestine, Tunisia, and Egypt), see Pripstein Posusney (2002).9 For the purpose of illustration, we consider an electoral system majoritarian if its EET isgreater than 10%.
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Our analysis further corroborates this observation (Web Appendix E). Using thedifference between the seat-share and vote-share for the ruling parties as the dependentvariable, we find that the effective electoral threshold (EET, see our operationalizationbelow) variable is positive and significant even after taking into account a battery ofcontrols. Specifically, our results show that ruling parties are more likely to obtain 3.05%more seats under SMD systems (EET is 37.5%) than PR systems (EET is 5%). We furtherestimate an interaction model to examine how the SMD seat premium enlarges when thevote share for the ruling party increases. As we can see from Figure 2 below, our resultsfind a positive, self-reinforcing characteristic for the SMD seat premium: As the rulingparties strengthen, the SMD seat premium also increases. For instance, when the rulingparty obtains 65% of the vote share, a SMD system can provide the dictator an additional3.4% more seats than a PR system. Yet this seat premium increases to 8.25% when theruling party obtains 85% of the total vote. Altogether, these results conform to ourtheoretical proposition that SMD systems produce a substantially greater seat bonus thanPR systems in electoral authoritarian regimes.
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Figure 2: The Magnitude of the SMD Seat Premium Conditional upon Regime Strength
(Vote Shares of Ruling Parties)
Although PR systems do not generate an extra seat premium for the incumbent, PRsystems do possess several important characteristics imperative for the political survival ofauthoritarian regimes. First, since the opposition in authoritarian regimes can win seatswith smaller vote shares under PR systems, they are more willing to participate in politicswithin the existing institutional framework rather than taking an extremist or anti-systemapproach. In other words, PR systems make dictators’ institutional cooptation strategies,such as the use of elections and legislatures, even more effective. Importantly, oncedeciding to participate in elections and politics, the opposition groups are less likely tocoordinate their electoral campaigns and candidates to build a pre-electoral oppositioncoalition because of the seat-vote proportionality under PR systems. Barbera (2013)echoes our proposition and shows that PR systems tend to increase the number ofopposition parties in authoritarian countries with multi-party elections. Under SMDsystems, however, opposition parties have stronger incentives to coordinate their electionefforts to remain electorally viable since these systems produce high disproportionalityand underrepresentation (Strom et al. 1994; Golder 2006). Therefore, while SMD systemsencourage the opposition to unite and build a pre-electoral coalition, PR systems serve asan institutional device for autocrats to divide and conquer opposition parties electorallywithout even resorting to coercion or violence.We explicitly test the validity of this causal mechanism and see whether PR systemsprevent opposition parties from uniting to challenge the authoritarian ruler. We build onGandhi and Reuter (2013)’s comprehensive analysis of pre-electoral coalition formation in
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non-democracies, and we examine whether pre-electoral opposition coalitions10 are lesslikely to emerge under PR systems.Our empirical analysis supports this assertion (Web Appendix F). As we can see fromFigure 3, the probability of pre-electoral coalition is less likely to occur as electoral systemsbecome more proportional. When an authoritarian regime adopts a pure SMD system (EET= 37.5%), the probability of opposition party coalition is roughly 16.8%. But thisprobability drops to only 2.5% under PR systems (EET = 10%). Indeed, in our sample,several electoral authoritarian countries with PR systems do not witness an oppositioncoalition (Guyana, Paraguay, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Tunisia, Turkey (authoritarianrule, 1945-1961; 1971-1973), and Suharto’s Indonesia), whereas ruling parties in SMDcountries, such as Georgia (2003), Azerbaijan (2005), Zimbabwe (2000), and Malaysia(1990-2004) had to compete with a unified opposition.
Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of Pre-Electoral Opposition CoalitionNote: Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Second, PR systems are associated with higher turnout (Jackman 1987; Blais 2006).This strong empirical regularity can be attributed to the lower barrier of entry to politics(Norris 2004). Since fewer votes are wasted under PR systems, voters, especiallysupporters of minor and opposition parties, have greater incentive to vote in elections.
10 A dichotomous variable coded 1 “if there was a significant pre-electoral coalition amongopposition parties, and 0 otherwise.” (Gandhi and Reuter 2013: 143)
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Importantly, high turnout is crucial for dictators, since winning an election with highmobilization and participation reinforces the regime’s popularity and invincibility(Magaloni 2006). For instance, De Miguel, Jamal, and Tessler (2015) note that in the recentEgyptian elections, the election “had to be extended for an additional day to bolster turnoutbecause, according to news reports, may voters ‘stayed home due to political apathy,opposition to another military man becoming president, discontent at suppression offreedoms among liberal youth, and calls for a boycott by Islamists” (1363). By promotinghigher turnout, PR systems secure the authoritarian regime greater legitimacy, and hencedeter not only mass counter-mobilizations but also political divisions within rulingcoalitions.Using our data on turnout in authoritarian elections, we find that a 1% increase in EETlowers turnout by 0.2% (Web Appendix G). Substantively, this implies that turnout underSMD systems is 6.8% lower than that under PR systems. In line with robust findings fromdemocracies (Jackman 1987), we find supportive evidence that PR systems also boost voterturnout in electoral autocracies. In countries adopting PR systems like Guyana (84.42%),Paraguay (78.88%), Equatorial Guinea (86.3%), Rwanda (97.25%), Tunisia (86.59%),Turkey under authoritarian rule (80.54%), and Suharto’s Indonesia (91.01%), more votersturn out than countries with the pure SMD systems such as Haiti (45.64%), Georgia(64.63%), Azerbaijan (61. 17%), Uganda (65.5%), Zimbabwe (57.27%), and Pakistan(48.9% under authoritarian rule, 1985-1988; 2002-2010).On the flip side, SMD systems can encourage the formation of a unified opposition andsuppress turnout. In turn, unified coalitions can increase the opposition’s ability tochallenge the dictator and low turnout can breed citizens’ apathy and discontent towardthe authoritarian regime. Unified opposition and low turnout may also signal to rulingelites that the regime is weak, encouraging their defections. For instance, in the 2003Georgian election held under a pure SMD system, the two main opposition parties formed acoalition prior to the election. In the midst of political apathy and discontent, the pre-electoral coalition played an important role in successfully mobilizing protests againstPresident Shevardnadze, paving the way to the “Rose Revolution” (Welt 2006).
The Dictator’s Strength and the Choice of Electoral SystemsGiven these divergent effects of electoral systems, we argue that dictators’ optimalchoice of electoral systems crucially depends on dictators’ strengths. Our central argumentis that only “strong” dictators are incentivized to use PR systems, while “weak” dictatorstend to rely on SMD systems.We conceptualize dictators’ strengths as their capacity to induce (either voluntary orinvoluntary) compliance from ruling elites within the regime and citizens in the society.We consider a dictator “strong” (“weak”) if he has (in)sufficient resources and capacity toexercise his influence and control over ruling elites and citizens. Therefore, a strong (weak)dictator is more (less) capable of securing submission from ruling elites and the citizenry tohis authority. A more generalizable way to understand dictators’ strengths is to examine
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the distribution of power in inducing political compliance along two important dimensions:one between the dictator and the ruling elites, and the other between the dictator and thesociety. Point A on the upper-right corner in Figure 4 represents a strong dictator whoholds control over the elites and the society. Point B on the lower-left corner in Figure 4indicates a weak dictator as his ability to gather political support is low. Usingcontemporary China as an illustrative example, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping representthe ideal type of strong dictators, whereas Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao are examples of weakdictators.
Figure 4: Dictators’ StrengthsDictators A (Strong Dictators)
Society B (Weak Dictators)
Ruling elites DictatorsOn a broader level, we argue that the distribution of power along these two dimensionsfundamentally shapes the political landscape of authoritarian regimes. Specifically, the twomost important threats for any authoritarian regime—coups and mass mobilization—aredetermined by dictators’ position along these two dimensions. Obviously, for thosedictators who fully monopolize the power vis-à-vis the ruling elites, the odds they will beforced out of office by a coup are relatively small. Similarly, for those dictators who securecompliance from the society, the chance they will be overthrown by a revolution is alsoquite low. Our conceptualization of strong dictator parallels what Svolik (2012) refers to asthe “established autocrats” which “… have acquired so much power that they can no longerbe credibly threatened by their allies (p.6).” On the other hand, a weak dictator is similar towhat Svolik refers to as the “contested autocracy” where “…politics is one of balancingbetween the dictator and the allies.”Viewing authoritarian politics from this standpoint, we argue that strong dictators aremore likely to choose PR systems. With their strong capacity to induce compliance fromruling elites and citizens, strong dictators can reasonably expect to win the election with alarge vote share. Under such circumstances, strong dictators are less dependent on theseat-premium produced by SMD systems. To put it differently, strong dictators who canmanage a landslide victory without the seat bonus from the SMD can “afford” to employ PRsystems. Importantly, we argue that strong dictators can trade the SMD seat bonus for thebeneficial effects of PR systems. First, as we previously discussed, since PR systemsincrease turnout, PR systems help dictators demonstrate their strengths. Since PR systemsencourage more voters to go to the polling stations due to the low barrier of entry, theruling party’s overwhelming electoral victory is more likely to legitimize the incumbent
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regime. Second, and perhaps more importantly, political power and strength are transitoryin nature (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). In other words, the distribution of powerbetween the dictators, the ruling elites, and the society is fluid and not permanent.Therefore, while dictators are strong today, it is reasonable for them to questionthemselves whether they will have similar strength in the future. Under suchcircumstances, strong dictators are incentivized to lock in their political strengths today bychoosing PR systems. Specifically, by capitalizing on the fact that PR systems divide theopposition parties, PR systems preempt the emergence of strong and unified oppositionand hence serve as a lock-in device to preserve the strength of dictators into the future.Choosing PR systems, however, can be politically risky for weak dictators. Since PRsystems do not yield the additional seat dividend like SMD systems, dictators need tocollect a sufficient amount of votes to win a landslide victory. However, when dictators lackthe necessary resources and capacity to induce political compliance and electoral supportfrom voters, PR systems may in fact backfire and reveal regime weakness instead. To besure, weak dictators can “cheat” with electoral fraud and still manage to secure a majorityin legislature. Yet, these measures are also costly because electoral fraud and malfeasancecan also backfire on authoritarian governments and undermine regime legitimacy (Tucker2007;Hufner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski. 2014; Norris 2014). Instead of selecting PRsystems, we argue that weak dictators are more likely to choose SMD systems. Specifically,when dictators are weak, they are mostly concerned with challenges from ruling elites. AsSvolik (2012) persuasively demonstrates, more than two-thirds of dictators are forced outof power by ruling elites.11 Under such circumstances, weak dictators have greaterincentive to boost their seat share by using SMD systems. Importantly, those extra seatshares give weak dictators extra bargaining chips to co-opt their potential challengers. Inso doing, autocrats ensure ruling elites, the most imminent threat to autocrats, remain loyalto the regime as much as possible. Taken together, we propose the following hypothesis:
H1: dictators with greater capacities to induce compliance are more likely to choose PR over
SMD systems.
Evidence
Sample: Electoral AuthoritarianismWe focus on electoral authoritarian regimes for the period of 1946-2007. FollowingSchedler (2002), we consider electoral authoritarianism as those autocratic states wheremulti-party elections are held, certain degrees of pluralism and competition are allowed,but minimal democratic norms are severely violated. Based on previous work on electoralauthoritarian regimes, we use two data sources to identify electoral authoritarian regimes.The first source is National Elections in Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA). Hyde and
11 Svolik goes so far as to argue “…the predominant political conflict in dictatorshipsappears to be not between the ruling elite and the masses but rather among regimeinsiders (p.5).”
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Marinov (2012) regard elections as minimally competitive if there is ex ante uncertaintyover election results. More specifically, elections are minimally competitive if (1) multipleparties are legal, (2) more than two candidates are allowed to stand in electoral districts,and (3) the opposition is allowed to participate in the election. We use these criteria toidentify electoral authoritarianism from the sample of non-democracies defined byCheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland’s (2009).NELDA’s operationalization is useful because it provides us with a large number ofcountries over an extensive time period. Yet, it does not include countries where politicalparties are de jure illegal but relevant political groups function as de facto political parties(e.g. Jordan, Kuwait, Swaziland, and Uganda). Therefore, we compliment NELDA with asecond source: Svolik’s (2012) dataset on the concentration of legislative power inauthoritarianism. Using Svolik’s data, we regard autocratic countries as electoralauthoritarian if multiple political actors, including both partisan and non-partisanopposition groups, compete in a legislative election.12 Taken together, we employ bothNELDA and Svolik (2012) to specify electoral authoritarian countries. If a country satisfiesthe necessary conditions in either one of the two datasets, we regard the country as anelectoral authoritarian regime. Web Appendix A contains the corresponding list of regimes.
Dependent Variable: Effective Electoral ThresholdThe core dependent variable, electoral system type, is measured using the EffectiveElectoral Threshold (EET) index originally proposed by Lijphart (1994). Since Boix(1999)’s seminal study,13 scholars have adopted this measure to explore the determinantsof electoral systems. Conceptually, EET measures “the proportion of votes that, for eachelectoral system, secures parliamentary representation to any party with a probability of atleast 50 percent” (Boix 1999: 614). Operationally,
ܧܧܶ = 75%(ܯ + 1)
12 Brownlee’s (2009: 524) defines electoral authoritarianism as “a system in whichelections are held but incumbents systematically manipulate the voting.”13 As Boix (1999: 614) suggests, dichotomous variables measuring electoral system types(i.e. dummy variables indicating SMD and PR systems) are unable to take into accountsignificant differences in electoral threshold brought by different district magnitudeswithin each system as well as legal thresholds adopted in PR systems. In addition, using thebinary dependent variable makes it very difficult to adopt a country-fixed effects modelbecause it drops countries that do not experience any change in electoral systems overtime. Given that electoral system choice should be driven by a number of unobservedcountry-level heterogeneities, a country fixed-effects model is an appropriate modelingstrategy.
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where M represents average district magnitude in a country-year. In our sample, EETranges from 0.27 to 37.5. When EET takes on the value of 37.5, it indicates the countryadopts the pure SMD system. As the country’s electoral system becomes more proportional,the value of EET becomes smaller. When EET is lower than the legal threshold that oftenexists in PR systems, we use the legal threshold as the Effective Electoral Threshold in thecountry.14 Using various data sources, we collect data on district size and legal thresholdfor all countries in the world between 1945-2010.15
Figure 5: Effective Electoral Threshold in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes
Source: Authors’ data
Figure 6: Regional Variations in Effective Electoral Threshold in Electoral
Authoritarianism
14 Even if we do not consider legal electoral threshold, the main results do not change.15 For data sources, see Appendix C.
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Source: Authors’ DataIn Figures 5 and 6, we show time-series variations (both level and change) as well asregional variations in EET in electoral authoritarianism. Interestingly, average EET hasbeen declining over time, indicating that more countries have tended to adopt PR systemsespecially after the end of the Cold War. Yet still, the SMD system (EET = 37.5) is thepredominant electoral system among electoral authoritarian countries. This suggests thatSMD systems are the optimal choice for many electoral autocrats. Still, 32.5 percent ofcountry-years adopt PR-based systems where EET is less than 10 percent.
Explanatory VariablesWe use measures of natural resource wealth to operationalize the main independentvariable: dictator’s capacity to induce compliance. Conceptually, natural resource wealthclosely taps into dictators’ strength and thus dampens rebellious attempts by potentialopponents. Specifically, it provides dictators with resources to strengthen the securityapparatus, give patronage spoils to ruling elites, and increase social spending. Allocating alarge amount of natural resources to the military and police, authoritarian leaders canimprove their capabilities of repressing opponents and rewarding military elites (Ross2001). In the face of a powerful dictator armed with a strong military, potential opponentswill find it difficult to rebel and have no choice but to remain loyal to the current regime. Infact, a large literature finds that high military spending tends to disincentivize coupattempts (Collier and Hoeffler 2005), and prevent rebel leaders from taking up arms (e.g.Hegre and Sambanis 2006). These pacifying effects of military spending are particularlystrong in oil-rich countries (Bodea, Higashijima, and Singh 2016). Oil resources alsoimprove dictators’ capability of distributing public goods to society. Since natural resourcewealth, particularly non-lootable natural resources such as oil and gas, has been mostlydominated by state or state-owned companies (Morrison 2009; Andersen and Ross 2014),
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it contributes to magnifying the dictator’s ability to exploit patronage distribution inderiving political support from constituencies. Placating citizens’ grievances through socialspending, natural resources enable autocrats to gain voluntary support from the citizenry.Indeed, numerous studies demonstrate that natural resource wealth tends to strengthendictators’ distribution capability (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Morrison 2009) and thusmakes autocratic regimes resilient to collapse (Smith 2004; Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef2009; Wright, Frantz, and Geddes 2013).16Methodologically, natural resource wealth is also ideal because it is mostly determinedby the international market and hence exogenous to electoral system types. Put differently,the use of natural resource wealth allows us to avoid endogeneity problems with respect toour dependent variable, the choice of electoral system. While there are other measures forfinancial recourses of the dictators (e.g., general fiscal revenues, government expenditure),these alternative measures invite the unwanted possibility of reverse causality. Indeed,several studies strongly suggest that PR systems lead to higher tax rates, higher welfarespending, and larger government deficits (Austin-Smith 2000; Persson and Tabellini 2004;Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006; Iversen and Soskice 2006).In sum, natural resource wealth serves as a good surrogate for estimating the effect ofdictator’s strength on the choice of electoral system. It also helps us mitigate the possibilityof reverse causality. To operationalize natural resource wealth, we use Ross’ (2012)variable of oil-gas value per capita, which is calculated by taking the product between acountry’s total oil-gas production and the current oil-gas price, then divided by totalpopulation. The variable has the most extensive data coverage among similar naturalresources variables, and it also focuses on the two most representative, non-lootableresources that greatly contribute to governments’ revenue opportunities: oil and naturalgas (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005).We also control for several confounding factors that may also impact electoral systemselection. First, according to Rokkan (1970) and Boix (1999), strong opposition threatsencourage ruling parties to adopt PR systems. Yet, using seat and vote shares of oppositionparties to measure opposition threats can be problematic since these indicators aredirectly affected by the dependent variable, the electoral system. They are also sensitive toother forms of electoral manipulation by dictators. Therefore, following Aksoy et al. (2015),we use the number of anti-government collective action events (riots, demonstration, andstrikes) as a proxy for opposition threats. Anti-regime collective actions, once successfullymobilized, can be highly threatening to authoritarian regimes. Hence, they can effectivelytap into the notion of opposition strength (Krichelli et al. 2011). Based on Banks’ (2009)
16 Haber and Menaldo (2011) argue that natural resource wealth does not have a negativeimpact on democratization. Although natural resources may not necessarily discourage acountry to democratize, there is still rich evidence that natural resources allow dictators tosurvive longer and prevent authoritarian breakdown (Morrison 2009; Wright, Frantz andGeddes 2013).
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data, we calculate a three-year moving average of the number of riots, strikes, anddemonstrations.The literature of democratic diffusion suggests that the spread of democracy has asignificant impact on the propensity to move to PR systems (Blais et al. 2004). Following Liand Reuveny (2003), we use the proportion of democratic countries in a given region tooperationalize the spread of democracy. In addition, as we discussed previously, scholarshave emphasized the importance of uncertainty. For instance, Andrews and Jackman(2006) suggests that if uncertainty is high, ruling parties especially in new democracies aremore likely to adopt PR systems. In order to control for this possibility, we add the numberof years since a given country transitioned into an electoral authoritarian regime. We alsoconsider colonial origins (former British, French or Spanish colonies) since former Britishcolonies are more likely to adopt SMD systems (Blais and Massicote 1997). Finally,following Boix (1999), we add standard controls such as logged total population, loggedterritorial size, trade openness, and ethno-linguistic fractionalization.
Empirical AnalysisThe unit of analysis is country-year.17 In all models, we add a lagged dependent variableto control for time dependence, or path-dependent characteristics of electoral systems (Cox1998). To deal with time-specific effects, we include half-decade dummies.We first employ fixed-effects models to explain within-country variation in the EETwhile controlling for unobserved country-specific heterogeneity. As an obviously naïve firsttest, we regress the variable of EET on the variable of dictators’ strength alone in Table 1(Model 1). The result, confirming our theoretical hypothesis, suggests strong dictators tendto choose PR systems.One naturally suspects that this simple bivariate result must be spurious, and reflectsan association between dictators’ strength and other confounding factors. Accordingly, wenext incorporate all of the control variables discussed above into our model specification. 18As we can see, the results in Model 2 corroborate our previous finding on the relationshipbetween dictators’ strength and their optimal choice of electoral systems.
17 There are several reasons why we use a country-year data structure rather than country-election year. First, our data collection suggests that some electoral system reforms areimplemented during non-election years (e.g. Mexico, Sri Lanka, and Russia). Country-election year data makes the analysis less accurate in capturing the timing of electoralsystem change. Second, the country-year data format enables us to control for country-fixed effects by expanding the time-series dimension.18 Since logged territorial size and ethno-linguistic fractionalization rarely change overtime, and a country’s colonial origins are time-invariant, we include these three variablesonly in GMM models.
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One legitimate methodological concern regarding Model 2 is the “Nickell bias,” whichargues that in panel data with T time units, adding a lagged dependent variable in fixed-effects model will yield biased estimates of order 1/T (Nickell 1981). The potential Nickellbias is particularly concerning since the number of countries (95) is larger than the time-series (65) in our paper. Therefore, we also estimate system GMM models (Arelano andBover 1995; Roodman 2007) to guard against this bias and to better capture the dynamicrelationship between dictators’ strength and electoral systems. Another advantage of theGMM model is that it allows us to further take into account several time-invariant factorssuch as colonial origin (British, French and Spanish colonies), ethnic heterogeneity, andcountry size that might influence electoral system choice. The coefficient estimate for thevariable of dictators’ strength remains negative and significant in Model 3.Recently, a debate emerged regarding how to best measure the natural resourceabundance for a country (Ross 2012, 15-17; Smith 2015). While reconciling this debate isbeyond the scope of this paper, we ensure that our previous findings do not result from anarbitrary choice of the measurement. Therefore, we re-estimate both Model 2 and Model 3with an alternative measure of total resource income per capita by Haber and Menald’s(2011).Finally, we employ an instrumental variables approach in Model 6. Although we believenatural resources are mostly exogenous to electoral systems, astute readers may stillwonder whether autocrats adopting PR systems may pump more oil prior to elections tomaintain a supermajority in elections. Following Haber and Menaldo (2011), we use threevariables on proven oil reserves (1. proven oil reserve in billion dollars, 2. Proven oilreserve divided by country size, and 3. Proven oil reserve in regions) as instrumentalvariables. These instruments are ideal since they are highly correlated with oil-gas valueper capita, yet not directly affect the choice of electoral systems by autocrats.19 Again, theresults in Model 4 -6 reassure the robustness of our previous results.
19 The first stage model includes three instruments (proven oil reserve in billion dollars,proven oil reserve divided by country size, proven oil reserve in regions), country dummies,and the same set of variables introduced in the second stage model.
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Table 1: Determinants of Electoral Systems in Electoral Authoritarianism
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. For fixed effects models and instrumentalvariables (IV) estimation, clustered robust standard errors by country are adopted. The oil reserve variablesare taken from Haber and Menaldo (2011). GMM estimator is employed to run the IV estimation. F-values forthe instruments are statistically significant at the .01 level, suggesting that the instruments are strong enoughto explain variations in oil-gas value per capita. p***<0.01; p**<0.05; p*<0.1From Table 1, we can see that the variables for dictators’ strength are negativelyassociated with the electoral system variable in all models at conventional levels ofstatistical significance. These results clearly suggest that dictators with abundant naturalresources are more likely to adopt PR systems by lowering EET. For example, Model 2indicates that a $100 dollar increase in natural resource income per capita lowers EET by0.0215. Given the fact that the average change in EET ranges from -0.46 to 0.24 (Figure 3-[b]) and the mean of natural resource wealth is $708 USD, the impact of natural resourcewealth is considerably large.
Model 1 (FE) Model 2 (FE) Model 3 (GMM) Model 4 (FE) Model 5 (GMM) Model 6 (IV)
DV EET EET EET EET EET EET
Natural Resource Variable Ross (2012) Ross (2012) Ross (2012) HM (2011) HM (2011)
Instrumented
Ross (2012)
lagged EET 0.9*** 0.879*** 0.752*** 0.869*** 0.726*** 0.847***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.15) (0.03) (0.18) (0.04)
Lagged Natural Resource Wealth (100 dollars) -0.0143*** -0.0225* -0.0215* -0.0330** -0.0237* -0.0314***
(0.0035) (0.0124) (0.0115) (0.0137) (0.0001) (0.0072)
Anti-Government Collective Action 0.170* 0.14 0.191* 0.16 0.243**
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Lagged Trade Openness -0.0005 0.005 -0.127 0.007 -0.00186
(0.01) (0.01) (0.984) (0.008) (0.007)
Logged Population -0.142 0.373 8.18E-05 0.456 -0.3720
(0.88) (0.52) (0.01) (0.602) (0.921)
Duration of EA Regimes -0.011 -0.028 -0.013 -0.033 -0.015
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.037) (0.026)
Regional Democracy -0.0689 -0.022 -0.0635 -0.0348 0.0691
(0.13) (0.20) (0.13) (0.224) (0.167)
Logged Land -0.32 -0.37
(0.36) (0.42)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization 0.41 0.52
(1.31) (1.45)
British Colony 3.16 3.67
(2.13) (2.68)
French Colony 0.57 0.77
(1.15) (1.34)
Spanish Colony -0.58 -0.53
(1.55) (1.72)
Constant 1.891*** 4.82 1.51 1.00
(0.56) (14.46) (5.33) (5.85)
F Value 380.09*** 378.58*** 298.4*** 170.34***
Wald Chi^2 3019.96*** 2571.65***
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Half-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Countries 92 86 86 85 85 86
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(2) N/A N/A 0.294 N/A 0.127
Hansen Test N/A N/A 0.783 N/A 0.743 0.839
F Test on Instrument in First Stage 194.24***
Observations 1,658 1,435 1,431 1,288 1,284 1,343
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On the other hand, when we examine the control variables, only the opposition threatsvariable is statistically significant. Yet, the sign of the coefficient is opposite to Boix’s(1999) expectation. This result suggests that Boix’s theoretical prediction might beapplicable only in democracies and not in authoritarian regimes. Instead, strong andcredible threats from the opposition may encourage dictators to select an SMD system inorder to capitalize on the seat-premium.
Additional Tests and Robustness ChecksOur hypothesis about natural resources and electoral system design is based on anassumption that natural resources should encourage compliance among people and thusincrease their political support for the regimes. In order to provide direct evidence on this,we empirically test whether natural resource wealth does contribute to mobilizing regimesupporters in legislative elections (Web Appendix D). We find that a larger amount ofresource wealth increases both vote shares and margins of victory for ruling parties (SeeWeb Appendix D). Substantively, a 100 dollars increase in natural resource wealth boosts aruling party’s vote share by 0.4% and enlarge its margin of victory by 0.7%.In order to ensure the robustness of the main findings, we run additional models. First,since it is possible that authoritarian leaders choose PR systems after severely limitingpolitical competition prior to elections, we include Polity IV index (one-year lagged) as acontrol. Controlling for political competition, however, does not alter the key result. Second,we add regional dummies to system GMM models to consider the possibility thatunobservable regional factors affect electoral system choice. Yet, including regionaldummies has no effect on our prior results. Third, we use an alternative measure ofEffective Electoral Threshold, in which we do not adjust its score by the legal threshold thatis often adopted in PR systems; the main findings remain stable. Fourth, since the oil-gasvariable is highly dispersed, it is possible that influential observations are driving theresults. In order to deal with such possible outliers, we thus exclude each country one byone from the sample and check if the effect of the natural resource wealth variable on EETremains negative and statistically significant. The impact is robust to potential influentialobservations.Finally, according to Ross and Andersen (2014: 4), “[u]ntil the 1960s, most of the rentsgenerated by oil production in non-Western countries were captured by a handful of large,vertically-integrated international oil companies—sometimes called ‘the Seven Sisters.’ Butin the 1970s, the industry was transformed by a wave of nationalizations and contractrevisions that enabled the governments of host countries to seize control of these rents.” Inorder to take into account the history of natural resource rents as a “resource curse,” welimit the sample to the period of 1970-2010. Nonetheless, natural resource endowmentsremain negatively correlated with the EET.
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ConclusionThis paper has explored the logic of electoral system choice in electoral autocracies. Inelectoral authoritarian regimes where opposition parties are weak, dictators gain a seatpremium under SMD systems which help them secure an overwhelming parliamentarymajority. However, strong dictators, who are capable of mobilizing regime supporters, areincentivized to shift electoral systems from SMD to PR systems since PR systems helpdictators divide and conquer the opposition and increase voter turnout, thus fostering animage of regime invincibility. Using original datasets of electoral authoritarianism, ourcross-national analyses render strong empirical evidence endorsing our theoreticalexpectations: (1) natural resource endowments have a negative effect on Effective ElectoralThreshold; (2) SMD systems produce larger seat premiums exclusively for the rulingparties; and (3) PR systems discourage opposition party cohesion while simultaneouslyencouraging voter turnout.The analyses presented in this paper suggest multiple policy implications and furtherresearch agendas on authoritarian politics. First, we show that authoritarian leadersstrategically choose an electoral system depending on their mobilization power. By doingso, dictators use electoral institutions to their advantage. Without closely investigating adictator’s capability of garnering political support, the international community may not beable to implement effective measures to reform electoral systems, thereby pushing thecountry to achieve further democratization.Second, the present study proposes a greater need for research on indirectmanipulation techniques like electoral system change, gerrymandering, andmalapportionment as useful tools in a dictator’s toolbox. Since direct, blatant electoralfraud often hurts authoritarian leaders by sparking popular protests and other dissent(Tucker 2007; Hafner-Burton et al. 2014; Higashijima 2015), indirect election manipulationbecomes a more secure strategy for authoritarian rulers. One possible research agendamay be to explore relationships between direct and indirect manipulation techniques bysystematically theorizing when authoritarian rulers are tempted to use blatant measuresover indirect ones and vice versa.Third, the theory proposed here makes another prediction about the economicconsequences of electoral system in authoritarian regimes: as dictators need to mobilize alarger number of regime supporters, they should adopt expansionary fiscal and monetarypolicies to maintain electoral dominance under PR systems. Studying the various aspects ofeconomic outcomes under different authoritarian electoral systems would be anotherpromising research topic.Finally, this paper also suggests the possibility that natural resources significantly affectinstitutional design in authoritarian regimes. Scholars of electoral authoritarianism haveexamined how political institutions change the prospect of dictator survival. However, asPepinsky (2014) rightly points out, political institutions in authoritarian regimes should beendogenous to power relations and the distribution of economic resources in the country.
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If natural resource wealth influences the origins of political institutions in dictatorships,then we will have to elaborate on an endogenous theory of authoritarian politics, whichenables us to take into account both causes and consequences of political institutions indictatorships, and test the theory with a well-planned research design.
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Appendix A: List of Electoral Authoritarian Countries
Note: Electoral authoritarian countries are identified by using Hyde and Marinov (2012), Svolik (2012) andKinne and Marinov (2013). Countries shown here are based on Model 1.
Electoral Authoritarianism Time Period Electoral Authoritarianism Time Period
Afghanistan 2004-2007 Kyrgyzstan 1995-2005
Albania 1990-1992 Laos 1960, 1965-1974
Algeria 1997-2007 Lebanon 1993-2007
Angola 1992-2007 Lesotho 1967-1970, 1993, 1998-2007
Argentina 1962 Liberia 1985-2002, 2005
Azerbaijan 1993-2007 Libya 1952-1955
Bahrain 1999-2007 Madagascar 1961-1974, 1992
Bangladesh 1973-1974, 1978-1982, 1986-1990, 2007 Malaysia 1958-1967, 1973-2007
Belarus 1994-2007 Mauritania 1961-1963, 1992-2007
Benin 1961-1962 Mexico 1967-2000
Bolivia 1979 Moldova 1993-1997
Bosnia 1996-2007 Morocco 1970-2007
Botswana 1969-2007 Mozambique 1994-2007
Burkina Faso 1970-1973, 1978-1979, 1992-2007 Namibia 1994-2007
Burundi 1965, 1996-2007 Nepal 1959, 2002-2005
Cambodia 1954-1970, 1972-1974, 1993-2007 Nicaragua 1946-1950, 1971-1978
Cameroon 1964-1969, 1992-2007 Niger 1996-1999
Central African Requblic 1961, 1992, 2005-2007 Pakistan 1977, 1985-1988, 2003-2007
Chad 1961-1962, 1996-2007 Panama 1952, 1989-1990
Chile 1989 Paraguay 1968-2007
Comoros 1989-1994, 1996-1998 Peru 1990-2000
Congo Brazzaville 2002-2007 Philippines 1965-1985
Congo Kinshasa 1963-1964, 2006-2007 Russia 1994-2007
Cyprus 1961-1965, 1968-1977 Rwanda 2003-2007
Czechslovakia 1946-1947 Senegal 1963-1967, 1977, 1982-2000
Djibouti 1992-2004 Serbia 1993-2006
Ecuador 2000-2003 Sierra Leone 1967-1981
Egypt 1976-2007 Singapore 1968-2007
El Salvador 1963-1979, 1982-1984 Somalia 1969-1975
Equatorial Guinea 1969-1978, 1991-2007 South Africa 1951-2007
Fiji 1972-1986, 1993-2005 South Korea 1949-1959, 1963-1988
Gabon 1961-1966, 1990-2007 Sri Lanka 1977-1989
Gambia 1969-2007 Swaziland 1972-1977, 1993-2002
Georgia 1995-2004 Sudan 1964, 2000-2004
Ghana 1961-1965, 1992-2007 Syria 2007
Guatemala 1955-1957, 1963-1966, 1985 Taiwan 1991-2002
Guinea 1995-2007 Tajikistan 1994-2007
Guinea-Bissau 1994-2000, 2004-2005 Tanzania 1962-1968, 1995-2007
Guyana 1968-2007 Thailand 1955-1957, 1969-1970, 1975, 1980-1983, 2006-2007
Haiti 1987-2007 Tunisia 1960-1963, 1979-1986, 1989-2007
Honduras 1954-1956 Turkey 1946-1961, 1971-1973, 1983
Indonesia 1955-1965, 1971-1998 Uganda 1966-1968, 1986-2007
Iran 1990-2007 Uzbekistan 1993-2002
Iraq 1953-1957, 2005-2007 Venezuela 1947
Ivory Coast 1991-2007 Yemen 1993-2007
Jordan 1947-1970, 1989-2007 Yugoslavia 1991
Kazakhstan 1994-2007 Zambia 1965-2007
Kenya 1964-2002 Zimbabwe 1980-2007
Kuwait 1964-1975, 1982-1985, 1992-2007
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics
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Appendix C: Data SourcesAfrican Elections Database. http://africanelections.tripod.com/Banks, Arthur and Thomas Muller (Eds.) Political Handbook of the World (1993-2008,various volumes). CSA Publications.Inter-Parliamentary Union. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.aspKeefer, Philip. Database of Political Institutions.Nohlen, Dieter, Michael Krennerich, and Bernard Thibaut (Eds.) Elections in Africa: A Data
Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Nohlen, Dieter, Florian Grotz, and Christof Hartmann (Eds.) 2001a. Elections in Asia and the
Pacific: A Data Handbook, Volume I: The Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia. Oxford:Oxford University Press.Nohlen, Dieter, Florian Grotz, and Christof Hartmann (Eds.) 2001b. Elections in Asia and the
Pacific: A Data Handbook, Volume II: South East Asia, East Asia and the South Pacific. OxfordUniversity Press.Nohlen, Dieter ed. 2005a. Elections in the Americas, Volume I: North America, Central
America, and the Caribbean. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Nohlen, Dieter ed. 2005b. Elections in the Americas, Volume II: South America. Oxford:Oxford University Press.Nohlen, Dieter and Philip Stoever eds. 2010. Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook. Nomos.Roeder, Philip. Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Indices for 1961 and 1985.http://pages.ucsd.edu/~proeder/data.htm
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Appendix D: Natural Resource Wealth and Dictator’s Mobilization Power
To test whether natural resource wealth contributes to boosting regime support at elections, we usetwo dependent variables. The first measure is total percentage of votes cast for ruling parties. This is astraightforward measure because we can directly estimate what determines ruling party’s popularity atthe ballot box. Yet, authoritarian leaders may care more about to what extent they win big relative toopposition parties (Simpser 2013). Thus, we use the second measure, margins of victory,operationalized as the gap in percentages of vote shares between ruling parties and opposition parties.For natural resource wealth, we use two measures. First, we use Ross’ (2012) variable of oil-gas valueper capita, which is calculated multiplying a country’s total oil-gas production by the current oil-gasprice and then divided by total population (Ross 2012). The variable has the most extensive datacoverage among other similar natural resources variables and also focuses on two representative non-lootable resources that greatly contribute to the government’s revenue opportunities: oil and naturalgas (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005). Second, Haber and Menald’s (2011) total resource income per capita isalso used to check the robustness of the results. This variable includes coal and metal minerals, as wellas oil and gas. Both measures are nearly collinear (r = 0.98).
Model D1 Model D2 Model D3 Model D4 Model D5 Model D6
DV: Ruling Party's Electoral
Performance
Share of
Votes (%)
Margin of
Victory (%)
Share of
Votes (%)
Margin of
Victory (%)
Share of
Votes (%)
Margin of
Victory (%)
Natural Resource Variable Ross (2012) Ross (2012) Ross (2012) Ross (2012) HM (2011) HM (2011)
Lagged Natural Resource Wealth 0.00359** 0.00791** 0.00408** 0.00730** 0.00380*** 0.00644***
(0.0018) (0.0036) (0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0014) (0.0025)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization -1.799 -6.117 -3.956 -9.846
(4.78) (8.20) (4.92) (8.95)
Opposition Boycott 5.942*** 14.54*** 6.584*** 15.43***
(2.02) (4.01) (1.84) (4.48)
Electoral Fraud -1.508 -5.113** -1.345 -5.348
(1.18) (2.45) (1.64) (3.26)
Election Violence -8.544*** -14.45*** -8.432*** -14.66***
(1.91) (3.61) (2.08) (3.67)
Lagged Polity IV -0.40 -1.057*** -0.464* -1.130***
(0.25) (0.39) (0.26) (0.41)
Parliamentarism 4.095* 3.91 4.705** 5.07
(2.33) (4.25) (2.17) (4.21)
Lagged GDP per capita (logged) -1.185 -1.074 -1.743 -2.95
(1.84) (3.41) (2.04) (3.63)
Lagged GDP Growth 0.514*** 1.111*** 0.501*** 1.051***
(0.130) (0.277) (0.138) (0.289)
Constant 59.59*** 21.99*** 68.75*** 69.61*** 88.21*** 75.72**
(4.52) (8.39) (16.590) (26.35) (17.16) (30.47)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Half-decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Countries 83 83 73 73 72 72
Observations 331 327 285 282 274 271
R-squared 0.341 0.097 0.446 0.271 0.464 0.272
Wald Chi2 202.64*** 64.07*** 636.73*** 135.44*** 324.23*** 621.00***
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Besides financial resources, to what extent authoritarian rulers can garner votes is determined byother covariates. To consider other relevant covariates, we introduce the following control variables. Ifthere are many ethnic groups in society, it may be more difficult for ruling parties to garner politicalsupport. Given this, we include Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization, constructed by Roeder (2002).If opposition parties refuse to join elections, then ruling parties can win elections more easily with alarge margin. A dummy variable for whether some opposition leaders boycott the election (Opposition’s
Boycott) is introduced using Hyde and Marinov’s (2012) NELDA dataset (NELDA 14). Intuitively, ifdictators stuff the ballot box, ruling parties should be able to increase their vote shares and winelections with larger margins. On the other hand, if electoral fraud is used more frequently by weakdictators, who cannot mobilize regime supporters, such a positive correlation may not be observedbetween the variables. A dummy variable for Electoral Fraud is taken from NELDA 11.20 Previous workclaims that pre-electoral violence, which is mainly exercised by ruling parties against oppositioncandidates and supporters, is conducive to ruling party’s electoral victory (Straus and Taylor 2012;Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). Similar to electoral fraud, if only weak dictators use electionviolence, its effect is not observed in the form of ruling party’s vote share and margins of victory. We useNELDA 33 to introduce a dummy variable for Electoral Violence.21 If strong Political Competition isguaranteed, it is harder for ruling parties to win elections overwhelmingly. For this, Polity IV score (one-year lagged) is also included in models. When a legislative election is held in a parliamentary system,authoritarian leaders may spend more efforts to win the election than a legislative election in apresidential system because election results directly decide who holds power. A dummy variable for
Executive-Legislative Relations (0: presidentialism/semi-presidentialism; 1: parliamentarism) isintroduced.If the modernization theory is correct, ruling parties in rich countries find it difficult to collect votesbecause people become less dependent on government in terms of their economic well-being. LoggedGDP per capita (one-year lagged) is taken from Penn World Table 7.1 to control for the level of Economic
Development. Better economic performance should make dictators and their parties popular amongcitizens, leading to better electoral performance. GDP growth (one-year lagged) is measured to take intoaccount Economic Growth by using World Development Indicators.Table 2 presents the statistical results. In Models D1 and D2, we test the impact of naturalresource wealth on regime support without control variables. The natural resources variable haspositive impacts both on vote shares and margins of victory and the effects are statistically significant atthe .05 level. In Models D3 through D6, where we include the controls with two different measures fornatural resource wealth, the effects remain positive and statistically significant. Substantively, a 100dollars increase in natural resources income per capita tends to increase ruling parties’ share of votes by0.4% and their margin of victory by 0.73% (based on Models D3 and D4). The results suggest thatnatural resource wealth is positively associated with popular support for the dictators. These findingssupport our idea that natural resource wealth is a good surrogate to measure dictators’ mobilizationpower at the ballot box.22
20 “Before elections, were there significant concerns that the elections would not be free and fair?”21 “Was there significant violence involving civilian deaths immediately before, during and after theelection?” (NELDA 33)
22 Looking at the control variables, economic growth and opposition boycott display the anticipatedeffects in statistically significant ways. Meanwhile, the lagged Polity IV score has a negative, statisticallysignificant impact only on the margin of victory. And contrary to our theoretical expectation, electionviolence is negatively correlated with both ruling party’s vote shares and the margin of victory. This may
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Appendix E: The SMD Seat Premium
Note: Prais-Winsten regressions with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) are employed.Disproportionality is measured by ට ∑(ௌ௘௔௧௦೔೟ି ௏௢௧௘௦೔೟)మ
ଶ
in which both ruling and opposition parties areincluded to compute disproportionality. p***<0.01; p**<0.05; p*<0.1.In order to offer evidence of the SMD seat bias, our regression analysis uses the following threedependent variables:(i) Seats-Votes Gap of Opposition Parties. The first dependent variable is seats-votes gap for theopposition parties. Effective Electoral Threshold should have a negative effect on seat premiums for theopposition parties because, regardless of however large opposition parties might be, SMD systems onlyproduce a seat premium for the ruling party.(ii) Seats-Votes Gap of Ruling Parties. We use the seats-votes gap for the ruling parties. SMD systemsshould produce a seat bias in favor of the ruling party.indicate an endogeneity problem between election violence and regime strength: weak dictators, thosewho are not popular among constituents, may be more inclined to resort to election violence. As NELDA33 does not distinguish between pre- and post-election violence, this is a possibility. Yet, even if weexclude the election violence variable, the overall results do not change and natural resource wealth isstill positively associated with the dependent variables.
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(iii) Disproportionality Index. As a “placebo test,” we also compute a conventional disproportionalityindex, which has been widely used in the literature. Disproportionality is measured by
ට ∑(ௌ௘௔௧௦೔೟ି ௏௢௧௘௦೔೟)మ
ଶ
in which both ruling and opposition parties are included to computedisproportionality.23 Employing the disproportionality index, we test whether SMD systems produce alarger number of seats with higher seats-votes elasticity regardless of whether the parties are the ruling
or opposition groups.Regarding model specification, our models are based on Lijphart (1994), who includes logged
assembly size (the natural logarithm of total number of seats in the lower house) and government form(presidentialism vs parliamentarism) as main independent variables. We also control for vote shares ofindependents in the previous elections to parse out the impact of independent politicians’ strength.
23 Disproportionality is calculated by using seats-votes gaps in the ruling party andopposition camps, without disaggregating them into each party’s seats-votes gap.
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Appendix F: Determinants of Pre-Electoral Opposition Coalitions in
Electoral Authoritarianism
Note: Logistic regression is employed. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. p***<0.01;p**<0.05; p*<0.1
We employ logistic regression for the opposition coalition model. This model primarilyfollows Gandhi and Reuter (2013), which offers the most comprehensive analysis on pre-electoral coalition making in non-democracies. While their sample is comprised of onlynon-democracies (1946-2006), our sample is limited only to electoral authoritarianregimes.
Model 21 Model 22 Model 23
DV Pre-Electoral Coalition Pre-Electoral Coalition Pre-Electoral Coalition
Effective Electoral Threshold 0.0382** 0.0644*** 0.0783***
(0.017) (0.023) (0.027)
Natural Resource Wealth (one year lagged, 100 dollars) -0.00132* -0.00210*
(0.001) (0.001)
Age of Largest Opposition Party 0.194** 0.325***
(0.096) (0.099)
Number of Opposition Parties 0.120** 0.0836
(0.058) (0.070)
Ruling Party's Seat Share in the Previous Election 0.0166 0.0450**
(0.011) (0.018)
Parliamentarism -0.42 -1.634
(0.673) (1.056)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization 2.856** 3.338*
(1.129) (1.897)
Economic Growth (one year lagged) 0.024 0.0107
(0.042) (0.064)
Logged Total Population (one year lagged) -0.0611 0.0401
(0.174) (0.264)
Electoral Violence -0.136 1.011
(0.492) (0.760)
Lagged Dependent Variable 2.862***
(0.886)
Constant -5.424*** -8.543** -13.67**
(1.056) (3.9) (5.417)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes
Half Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of Countries 82 71 55
Observations 278 225 167
Log psedolikelihood -101.11 -69.75 -42.03
Wald Chi Squared 54.73*** 52.5*** 48.9***
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Appendix G: Determinants of Turnout in Electoral Authoritarianism
Note: Prais-Winsten regression with PCSEs is employed. p***<0.01; p**<0.05; p*<0.1. “Turnout (Original)”indicates that the dependent variable is measured by our original data. “Turnout (IDEA)” indicates thedependent variable is measured using the voter turnout dataset complied by International IDEA (available athttp://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm).
Model 18 Model 19 Model 20
DV Turnout (Original) Turnout (Original) Turnout (IDEA)
Effective Electoral Threshold -0.176*** -0.205*** -0.115*
(0.040) (0.056) (0.063)
Parliamentarism 5.104*** 4.475**
(1.913) (1.934)
Election Violence -2.545 -0.681
(1.935) (1.684)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization -3.1 1.093
(3.224) (4.757)
Opposition Boycott -4.043* -1.253
(2.205) (1.683)
Electoral Fraud -1.699 -0.145
(1.605) (1.987)
Logged GDP per capita 3.402*** 4.884***
(0.902) (1.020)
Compulsory Voting System (IDEA) -1.526
(4.395)
Constant 81.20*** 55.76*** 23.13**
(3.803) (10.080) (10.170)
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Hal-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of Countries 93 82 80
Observations 364 314 283
R-Squared 0.424 0.420 0.545
Wald Chi2 30.05*** 318.80*** 136.85***
